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I
INTRODUCTION

A no-fault compensation scheme should rank at the very top of a list of
long-term solutions to the perceived crisis in medical malpractice. The form
of no-fault system most likely to be adopted would be one providing
automatic compensation, not for all iatrogenic injuries, but for a limited set of
"designated compensable events." Such a compensation system would be
closely integrated with the day-to-day activities of health care providersindividual practitioners, institutions, and health maintenance organizations
(HMO's)-and would link compensation closely to the outcomes of medical
intervention. In addition to providing quick and equitable compensation for a
wide range of medically caused injuries, a properly designed system would
supply strong incentives for modifying provider behavior to improve the
quality of health care.'
Although a no-fault scheme might be embodied in legislation, this idea has
not yet been embraced by public policy makers. Nevertheless, it remains
possible (subject to concerns about the enforceability of agreements
modifying tort rights) for a no-fault scheme to be adopted privately in
provider/patient contracts backed by a form of casualty insurance. In the
current competitive environment of the health care industry, the availability of
the voluntary no-fault alternative would greatly expand the freedom of choice
2
of both providers and consumers of health care services.
II
PROSPECTS OF A NO-FAULT SYSTEM

The long-term prospects for a no-fault alternative to the existing tort
system of medical injury compensation look optimistic for several reasons. A
no-fault compensation mechanism would be far more effective than the much
maligned fault system in achieving the twin goals that the tort system is
supposed to serve-fair compensation and deterrence. To begin with, a noCopyright © 1986 by Law and Contemporary Problems
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fault system would effectively and fairly compensate those whose injuries fall
within its scope. The tort system is arguably inequitable in that its
decisionmaking processes do not always yield consistent results on similar
facts. 3 In addition, whether similar injuries will or will not be compensated
depends upon the fortuitous factor of the victim's ability to prove provider
fault. Although a no-fault scheme would almost certainly not undertake to
compensate all patients whose encounters with the health care system
produced a regrettable result, its coverage would be more extensive and more
systematic than that of the present system.
A no-fault system would also be more successful than the tort system in
preventing injuries through deterrence. 4 Evidence showing iatrogenic illness
to be frighteningly common and frequently

serious 5 -especially

in the

context 6 -indicates

hospital
that the tort system in its present form leaves
many avoidable injuries uncompensated. 7 Without fairly systematic
compensation, it is likely that injuries are suboptimally deterred, confirming
the fears of many that the tort system fails to deter even those injuries that
would be compensable under its own restrictive rules.8 Moreover, because
liability insurance, priced largely on the basis of community rather than
individual experience, insulates each physician against the true financial cost
of his detected negligence, the impression is reinforced that the existing tort
system creates inadequate incentives for accident avoidance. In contrast to
the tort system's primary reliance on stigma and publicity to induce better
provider performance, a properly designed no-fault approach would contain
appropriate financial incentives-through experience rating of providers-for
the prevention of injuries. It would also generate systematic data about
adverse events in a form permitting statistical analysis and comparison with
results at other treatment centers. This information could be fed back to the
responsible practitioners, who could modify their behavior to decrease the
accident rate in their facility.
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Another attraction of a no-fault system is that it could function more
efficiently than the current tort system. 9 Although estimates vary considerably
on the extent to which liability insurance premiums are consumed by
administrative expenses and never reach injured patients, the tort system's
transaction costs are very high, certainly well over fifty cents on each dollar.10
By eliminating the need to evaluate fault in every case and to litigate the issue
exhaustively in many of them, a no-fault system would save resources that
could be better applied to compensating patients.
In addition to having the foregoing advantages over the existing tort
system, the no-fault approach would bring about a minimization of
undesirable medical practices falling under the label of "defensive medicine."
Estimates of the cost of defensive medicine are at best speculative, and there
have been no good studies to delineate the precise range and impact of
defensive practices.II On the other hand, various groups have offered their
opinions. In a recent report, the American Medical Association suggested
that the defensive practice of medicine is widespread, amounting to over $15
billion annually.' 2 It would be wrong to suggest that all activities inspired by
the tort system and designated as defensive practices are undesirable; some
such activities enhance the quality of health care outcomes and should be
encouraged. i 3 But to the extent that costs are incurred without benefit to the
patient or patients are exposed to unnecessary and risky diagnostic
procedures, defensive practices create additional burdens on the public. By
avoiding public accusations of malpractice and the stigma attached to them, a
no-fault system would neutralize the motivational factors responsible for
defensive medical practices that provide no net benefit to patients.
The changing patterns of medical practice also point up the logic of
moving in the direction of a no-fault system. The development of HMO's and
large hospital conglomerates and the increasing involvement of employers in
controlling the cost of their employees' health care have brought about
profound changes in the structure of health care delivery.' 4 The old system of
physician-dominated health care provided little choice for the consumer. The
diversity resulting from HMO's and competitive medical plans of other kinds
is inevitably offering consumers new options and opportunities to economize
on the amount and quality of health care obtained and to seek the best
financial protection and quality of care attainable at reasonable cost. In this
new climate, concern about the costs generated by the malpractice situation
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and about the alignment of the compensation system with quality-of-care
5
objectives should make no-fault alternatives increasingly attractive.'
Other factors that increase the likelihood that a no-fault system will receive
increasing attention in the future include the widespread dissatisfaction with
the existing tort system and the recurrent sense of crisis that surrounds it.
Although primary emphasis is currently being placed on legislative tinkering
with the existing system, logic points toward increasing private innovation as
well. What is at stake is nothing less than the definition of the
physician/patient relationship. The overriding issue is whether the terms of
that intensely personal relationship ought to be prescribed exclusively by
government through political and legal processes or whether the relationship
should instead be shaped at least in part through private negotiation of
mutually satisfying arrangements. No-fault insurance offers an attractive
opportunity to strengthen physician/patient bonds and to shore up the values

of honesty and trust that are essential to a healthy, happy, and therapeutic
relationship. 16 Clinicians and others have observed that the current adversary
system, which threatens to pit a patient against a health care professional in an
acrimonious dispute, discourages the physician from revealing to the patient
his doubts and the full truth about the outcomes of his management because
such disclosures may trigger a malpractice suit.17 A no-fault scheme, by which

a provider acknowledges risks and undertakes to protect patients against
specific harms, should strengthen and improve both the subjective and the
objective quality of care.
III
SPECIFICATIONS FOR A No-FAULT PLAN

An ideal no-fault program would guarantee adequate compensation for all
medically induced injuries. Upon the occurrence of these events, a patient
would automatically receive compensation for economic losses (medical care
expenses and loss of wages) without the necessity of proving negligence
through a tort claim. In order to maintain provider responsibility for adverse
outcomes, the payment would come from a provider-purchased insurance
policy under which premiums and other features preserve provider incentives

to prevent or minimize the cost of injuries.
The most obvious problem with this ideal no-fault system is the high cost
of making health care providers insurers of good medical results for all their
patients. Moreover, such extensive coverage is not indicated on policy or any

other grounds. For one thing, it would duplicate financial protection that
most patients already have against medical expenses, death, and disability. In
addition, there would be great difficulty in distinguishing harms brought
about by treatment-iatrogenic injuries-from the natural consequences of
15.
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the patient's underlying disease or condition. Moreover, many of the
compensated harms would be unavoidable side effects of therapy the net
effect of which was decidedly beneficial, perhaps the best that could be
expected. For these and other reasons, a practical no-fault scheme would be
confined to covering a limited set of adverse outcomes that were specified in
advance-"designated compensable events" (DCE's). Patients suffering
adverse outcomes not appearing on the predefined list would remain free to
bring tort actions under traditional principles. Obviously, the extent to which
the problems of the existing tort system would be obviated by substituting nofault compensation would depend upon the scope of the DCE list.
The criteria for listing adverse medical outcomes as DCE's are crucial.
Presumably, the list should be developed by medical experts who are
concerned about protecting consumer interests and creating desirable
quality-of-care incentives as well as about letting providers avoid tort actions
(and large recoveries) for obvious negligence. The major criterion for the
identification of DCE's should be the relative avoidability of the outcome
under good medical practice.' 8 The idea would not be to list only outcomes
that were always avoidable or that could occur only under negligent
management; instead, if the statistical incidence of an outcome could be
reduced by good practice, it would be a candidate for listing even if the risk of
harm could not be eliminated altogether. This test would focus not only on
the extent to which the outcome is preventable, but also on whether it is
treatable once it occurs, so that the economic loss to the patient could be
minimized.
An equally important criterion would be the medical detectability of the
event. The individual DCE must be so clearly defined that it would be readily
identifiable and distinguishable without litigation from noncompensable
events. The third criterion in judging DCE's would be the impact that
compensating for a particular adverse outcome would have on the overall
quality of health care. In addition to the incentive created to prevent the
outcome, there is also a risk that physicians would be induced to make
inappropriate therapeutic choices, avoiding risks that it would be in the
patient's interest to run. Thus, the selection of an adverse outcome as a DCE
would require a multifactorial analysis going beyond strict medical notions of
causation and relative avoidability.
In 1977, the American Bar Association's Commission on Medical
Professional Liability conducted a study to determine the feasibility of a DCE
system. This project involved data from studies by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners of tort claims in two specialties, general surgery
and orthopedic surgery. Panels of specialists, convened to evaluate the
economically prominent adverse events emerging from the data, agreed that
several of these untoward outcomes would be appropriate DCE's. Despite the
complexities of differentiating those risks associated with the care itself from
18.
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those associated with patients' underlying medical conditions, the ABA
Commission concluded that this study had demonstrated the feasibility of
developing such a listing from the universe of treatment-related injuries.' 9
Although some have questioned the practical feasibility of developing a
workable list of DCE's, these intuitive criticisms are far less authoritative than
20
the ABA evaluation.
In addition to making no-fault concepts potentially practical in the health
care field, the DCE approach has several other advantages. One is its
flexibility. The DCE list can be updated periodically as panels of specialists
accept new adverse outcomes as deserving of compensation. The ease with
which adverse outcomes can be added to (or removed from) the list is
essential in a health care system in which new diagnostic and treatment
technologies are constantly being introduced, creating opportunities for a
wide range of mishaps. The list can also be expanded or contracted in light of
financial considerations and the relative attractiveness or unattractiveness of
2
the tort system. '
Predefinition of compensable events also links compensation to quality
assurance efforts and prevention. 2 2 Providers of health care are on notice
concerning adverse outcomes that are likely to occur and are implicitly
advised that they are avoidable through careful monitoring of the treatment
process. Whereas most quality assurance mechanisms operating in the health
care field focus on the quality of inputs employed (personnel licensure is one
example) or on the processes employed (evaluation by peer review bodies, for
example), the DCE approach focuses the attention primarily on outcomes-the
only matter of concern to the patient.
The fact that the DCE system focuses on avoidable outcomes and
maintains provider responsibility through experience rating suggests that it is
not in fact a major departure from the fault system, and indeed it is not. It is a
conceptually sound middle ground between a fault system and one that, 3like
2 It
no-fault auto insurance, would exonerate providers from responsibility.
differs from the fault system, however, in dispensing with a case-by-case
determination of negligence and the specific attribution of provider fault. It
would seem, in short, to offer the best of both worlds-wider compensation
and better deterrence of poor practice.
Aside from the problem of designing a workable DCE list, the
Decisions
implementation problems seem relatively straightforward.
regarding the level and character of compensation would have to be made.
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For example, should minimum or maximum payments for loss of wages be
provided for? Should any allowance be made for pain and suffering? More
complex issues might be encountered in trying to align the details of the
system with incentives that would appropriately influence provider behavior
to promote the quality of care. An especially troublesome issue would be
whether to allow patients compensated by collateral sources to enjoy a
windfall so that incentives for avoiding DCE's would not be diluted. One
suggestion is that collateral sources should be indemnified under the
providers' insurance policy. Another feature that has been proposed is an
obligation on the part of providers to disclose the occurrence of a DCE,
discouraging coverups and ensuring that those who are injured receive
compensation.
IV
SELLING THE No-FAULT CONCEPT

Although the idea of a no-fault system based on DCE's has been around
for some time, it has yet to be embraced as a practical program. Many have
been concerned that, by compensating automatically a wide range of injuries,
a DCE scheme would cost more than the existing system. 24 Although there
are no real data to support that fear, 25 it is a real concern. Despite the
likelihood of real savings in transaction and administrative costs and in
improved outcomes resulting from strengthened quality incentives, a well
designed DCE-based no-fault program should indeed compensate many
injuries that are not now the object of malpractice claims and might well entail
higher dollar outlays than for malpractice insurance. 2 6 Although many
observers are concerned only about this apparent bottom line, reflection
should make it clear that a DCE system would create no new costs but would
only transfer costs already being borne by other insurance programs or by
injured patients to providers (and ultimately to the consuming public, which is
bearing them already in other ways). When one offsets against the aggregate
dollar costs the savings in administrative costs, the anticipated improvements
in the quality of care, the benefits to other public or private collateral sources
(assuming their indemnification), and the reduced hardships of injured
patients, it is hard to see how the net social and ultimately private gain would
not be substantial.
Because of its radical nature and the lack of solid data concerning its
impact, the DCE approach is not likely to be embodied in legislation anytime
soon. A more practical approach for the present would be a "halfway"
24. Somers, The Malpractice Controversy and Quality of Patient Care, 55 HEALTH & SOC'v 193, 224
(1977).
25. But cf Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study, 128 W.J. MED. 360, 363-65 (1978). Mills states
that in California only 17% of potentially compensable events were likely to result in tort
compensation. Thus, the cost of automatically compensating the remaining 83% of potentially
compensable events, or even a more limited number of DCE's, could be considerably higher than the
existing system.
26. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 1, at 152-56.
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measure whereby a provider or provider group would agree with consumers
to compensate them automatically for injuries appearing on a list of DCE's.
The patient in turn would agree to surrender his tort rights with respect to
any such injury, thus giving up his small statistical chance for a big award
including pain and suffering in return for assured payment of his economic
losses in a much wider class of cases. Lawyers will of course wrinkle their
brows over such contracts and will hope to earn big fees litigating over their
enforceability. Assuming, however, that the agreement is reached under
circumstances that do not suggest overreaching and that the DCE list is long
enough to be fair to the patient-that is, that it really does increase his
protection against uncompensated injury-the agreement should certainly be
enforced. It is regrettable that the legal system makes such innovations so
uncertain, but the benefits of implementing the DCE approach are great
enough that parties should proceed even in the face of cautious legal advice.
Adoption by private contract of a no-fault compensation system based on
DCE's would square well with developments occurring in the health care field,
particularly the trend toward HMO's. In an HMO, relationships are primarily
defined by a contract that obligates the subscriber to pay a predetermined fee
and the provider to deliver the care necessary for the subscriber's wellbeing. 27 In addition to being subject to some regulation, HMO's must
bargain with sophisticated employers and employee organizations and will
have little opportunity to impose unfair provisions. Although HMO
subscriber contracts have usually stated the HMO's obligation in general
terms and presumed the applicability of noncontractual tort standards, they
could easily include a performance standard that permitted some deviation
from customary practice and replaced tort remedies with no-fault
compensation using DCE's.
An advantage of introducing the DCE system by voluntary agreement
rather than on a systemwide basis is the opportunity to start small and
experiment with the concept. For example, an HMO might introduce a DCE
system for a limited class of treatments or patients, or a single-specialty group
practice-orthopedic surgeons or obstetricians, for example-might offer a
no-fault plan to its patients, perhaps on an optional basis. In a pilot program
the patient population might be subdivided in various ways to eliminate highrisk patients and to ensure the program's actuarial soundness. As providers
and insurers were able to accumulate data on incidence of adverse outcomes
and experience in administering no-fault compensation, the system could
gradually expand to cover more and more patient injuries, whether or not
they presented appreciable malpractice problems. At the outset, the DCE list
would probably be conservative, comprised of only the most avoidable and
economically prominent adverse outcomes. Although legally it may be
necessary that the list not be too short and cover a significant number of
27. Henderson, Putting the DCE Lists to Work: Alternative Approaches to Establishing a Compensation
System for Victims of Medical Accidents, in ABA COMM'N ON MEDICAL PROF. LIAB., supra note 4, at 53, 5761.
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outcomes that would not have been readily compensated under the tort
system, the early no-fault schemes may be less extensive than they might
eventually become, The ultimate benefit of private experimentation with nofault compensation might be legislation substituting a DCE system for the
traditional tort recoveries. Such legislation might be compulsory or might
leave private parties to decide for themselves whether to participate.
System costs in early no-fault plans would probably be no less than the
cost of liability insurance covering the same class of injuries. (Indeed, if the
DCE list were to cover only outcomes that are so obviously caused by
negligence that they are almost automatically compensable by the tort system,
the scheme would risk being struck down by the courts as lacking in a quid pro
quo or mutuality-reducing awards to injured persons without significantly
expanding the class of persons compensated.) The lack of significant dollar
savings ought not to be decisive, however, if in fact the parties can all benefit
by eliminating litigation with its high costs-in acrimony and emotional wear
and tear as well as in dollars. If providers could see their patients
compensated for unfortunate events without regard to whether they were
caused by negligence, they would undoubtedly find the same, or even a
higher, cost worth paying. By the same token, consumers might decide that
higher costs for health care were justified in order to have adverse outcomes
covered under a DCE no-fault system. Moreover, if the incentive effects of the
DCE system improve the quality of care, costs might actually fall. In any
event, patients might find that they were getting better value, justifying
somewhat higher prices. Thus, both providers and patients might come to
attach a high value to a system in which patient grievances do not become
acrimonious lawsuits, compensation softens the burden of poor results,
providers are accountable for the quality of outcomes, trust and confidence
can be maintained between provider and patient, and there is no need for
lawyers to become involved.
V
CONCLUSION

Forces operating in the health care system make no-fault compensation a
desirable solution to the dilemma posed by the tort system of compensation
for medical injury. In the highly competitive environment that is becoming
increasingly pervasive in the health care system, various competitive medical
plans are allowing consumers to engage in an equal dialogue with providers
regarding the nature of their relationship and their respective rights and
obligations.
Increasing sensitivity to the ethical aspects of the
provider/consumer relationship and to the need for cost-saving measures
points to private contractual arrangements for the resolution of a wide variety
of health care issues. There are good reasons why compensation for medical
injuries should become an item in the bargaining between providers and
consumers for the first time and why a no-fault approach should attract
increasing interest.
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The tort system of medical injury compensation has failed at two of its
most important goals-the equitable compensation of injured patients and
the creation of incentives for injury avoidance. A no-fault system based on
designated compensable events offers an approach that should correct these
deficiencies, allow for maximum flexibility concerning the extent and degree
of coverage, and restore to the physician/patient relationship the trust and
confidence that are essential if the health care system is to work effectively. It
is indeed fortunate that the emergence of effective consumer choice allows for
creative experimentation with innovative alternatives to the existing medical
malpractice system.

